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Abstract: The paper discusses Seneca’s phrase ‘human rights’ (ius humanum) in
On Benefits 3 and relates the passage to recent debates about human rights in
Stoicism and ancient philosophy. I argue that the Latin phrase refers either to
rights or to a law conferring rights. The difference between the passage and a
common expectation for human rights lies in the kind of relation between right
and duty. In Seneca’s passage the right does not in itself have a correlative duty
on the part of other people, and yet it does, if exercised through benefactions,
create a duty in others. By contrast, the relation between right and duty is
usually expected to be unconditional.
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This paper is about a passage in De beneficiis where Seneca attributes ‘human
rights’ (ius humanum) to slaves. The passage, T1 below, receives a brief discus-
sion in a recent discussion of Stoicism and human rights, but it repays fuller
treatment.1 Exploring in more detail how it relates to philosophical discussions
of human rights today throws light on our own expectations of what is involved
in attributing a right, and of what should motivate the attribution; and for the
task of relating the passage to our expectations the broader context of the
passage – Seneca’s social theory and writing on gratitude – is not a distraction
but indispensable. In what follows I first discuss the meaning and translation of
the Latin wording; I then compare the passage with three arguments against
attributing to Stoics, or to ancient philosophers more generally, the concept of
human rights. On my account, the most important difference between the
Senecan passage and our own attributions of human rights lies in the kind of
*Corresponding author: Alex Long, School of Classics, University of St Andrews, St Andrews,
UK, E-mail: agl10@st-andrews.ac.uk
1 Bett (2012, 154–55) says that ius humanum in the passage ‘sounds remarkably like “human
rights”’. In his survey of philosophical discussions of slavery Garnsey cites the passage (1996,
67 n.6) but selects others for quotation and discussion. What follows focuses on the meaning of
ius humanum; for fuller accounts of slavery in Seneca see, in addition to Garnsey (1996), Griffin
(1992), chap. 8, Bradley (2008). It is not part of my project to consider whether Seneca is, in
Bradley’s words (2008, 340), ‘enlightened and liberal’.
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connection between the right and the duties of others on which the right has a
bearing.
In De beneficiis Book 3 Seneca argues that a slave can bestow a benefit upon
his master. Denying that this ever happens shows, he says, ignorance of ‘human
rights’.
T1 Praeterea servum qui negat dare aliquando domino beneficium, ignarus est iuris
humani; refert enim, cuius animi sit, qui praestat, non cuius status. Nulli praeclusa virtus
est; omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, et ingenuos et libertinos et servos et
reges et exules; non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est.
Moreoever, someone who denies that a slave ever gives his master a benefit is ignorant of
human rights: what matters is the mind of the person who bestows something, not his
political status.2 Nobody is barred from virtue: it is open to everyone, admits everyone,
summons everyone – freeborn, former slaves, current slaves, kings and exiles. Virtue does
not choose ancestry or property; the bare human being is enough for it. (3.18.2)3
Seneca and his opponent – the person said to be ‘ignorant’ – do not disagree
about what slaves should do for their masters.4 Their disagreement concerns
what a slave is capable of doing and whether we should speak of a slave
benefiting his master: does the slave’s status bar him from conferring benefits?
No, Seneca says, merely by being a human being the slave is capable of
bestowing a benefit and, more generally, of virtue and virtuous action. So if a
master is to understand his own slaves’ moral potential, including their poten-
tial in relation to the master himself, he should look not to the slaves’ status but
to their humanity.5 As Seneca says later, ‘does a master receive a benefit from
his slave? No, one human being receives a benefit from another. To conclude, he
[the slave] has done what was in his power (in illius potestate)’ (22.3–4). Seneca
then adds immediately that the master has the power to decline the benefit, a
point to which we will return.
The Latin phrase ius humanum could mean, among other things, ‘human
law’, ‘correct behaviour between humans’ or ‘human duties and rights’. We can
2 For the mind or intention as all-important see also 1.1.8, 1.6.1, 4.21.3, 6.9.3; Griffin (2013, 27).
3 All translations are mine unless indicated otherwise. The Latin text is that of Basore in the
Loeb Classical Library (1935). Unlike Basore recent English translators (Cooper and Procopé
1995; Griffin and Inwood 2011) accept the transposition of 18.2 and 18.3, but this does not affect
my discussion or translation of T1.
4 Hecaton of Rhodes is said to have raised the question of whether a slave can confer benefits
(3.18.1), but Seneca does not tell us his answer and so we should not call his opponent
‘Hecaton’. For the relationship between Hecaton and Seneca’s De beneficiis see Inwood (2005,
70–1); Griffin (2013, 20–1 and 24).
5 For the slave/human contrast see also De clementia 1.18.2, Letter 47.1.
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use the opponent’s position in T1 to clarify its meaning and see whether the
translation provided above, ‘human rights’, is better than these alternatives. The
opponent is ignorant of this ius. But the opponent is not necessarily ignorant of
which kinds of action constitute right or appropriate behaviour: Seneca’s oppo-
nent may know full well what the slave should do in his circumstances. ius
points to what the slave can do or is entitled to do, or (to quote 3.22 again) what
is ‘in his power’, not what he should do or what it is right to do. The Latin word
can do so in one of two ways: either (1) ius simply means ‘rights’ or ‘entitle-
ments’ or (2) it means the law by which the slave has those rights or entitle-
ments. On (2), we should translate ius humanum as ‘human law’ or something
similar, but the passage would still criticize the opponent for failing to recognize
the slave’s right to benefit and to be virtuous: Seneca would be saying that the
opponent’s ignorance of ‘human law’ blinds him to the fact that this law, unlike
Roman law, does not look to social status when endowing people with rights. So
although the Latin word ius can certainly encompass duties as well as rights, in
T1 Seneca means by ius either rights and entitlements, or law as a source of
them. English translators have recently chosen the first, ‘rights’, but the other
translation, law, also seems to me defensible.6 If we opt for interpretation (1),
‘rights’ is better than ‘right’, even though Seneca uses ius in the singular: the
Latin word does not need to be in the plural to represent a system or set of
rights, laws or duties, and Seneca soon goes on to argue that the slave can be
just and brave as well as a benefactor (3.18.4). The opponent is shown that the
slave has multiple moral possibilities.
The adjective humanum then indicates that the possibilities for the slave
derive simply from his being a human being and are shared with all other
human beings.7 On interpretation (1), the meaning is that the slave has these
rights as a human being. On interpretation (2), it is that the law – presumably
the natural, providential law – concerning the moral range of human beings
entitles slaves to supreme moral achievements; the opponent is ignorant that all
6 Cooper and Procopé (1995) (‘his rights as a man’); Griffin and Inwood (2011) (‘the rights he
has as a human being’). Préchac (1926–1927) has ‘les droits de l’homme’, and Basore (1935) has
‘the rights of man’. Compare the translation in Horsfall (2000) of ius maternum in Virgil Aeneid
7.402 (‘a mother’s rights’). The speaker has in mind not a mother’s obligations (that is, her
duties to her daughter), but her right as a mother to the other mothers’ sympathy and solidarity.
When commenting on the same line of Virgil, Fordyce (1977) notes that ‘ius is the code or
system of rights and duties which is recognized in some form of human relationship’, but
nevertheless suggests ‘a mother’s rights’ (rather than e. g. ‘a mother’s duties and rights’) as the
translation. My thanks to Harry Hine for discussion of the translation.
7 Contrast e. g. the right or ius of a mother (Virgil Aeneid 7.402, discussed in the previous note)
and the rights (iura) of parents in inheritance (Juvenal 9.87).
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human beings, slaves included, have these possibilities in common, and that
status in Roman law, as slave, exile and so on, or in some other local law (as
king, for example) makes no difference.
Elsewhere in De beneficiis Seneca uses the same phrase, ius humanum, to
refer not to rights belonging to a person, but to the norms governing interaction
between all human beings.8 In Book 7 Seneca asks whether a benefit should
always be repaid, regardless of the character of the benefactor. He imagines a
case where the benefactor is a horrifically cruel tyrant: in such a case, he says,
the tyrant has flouted the norms of interpersonal behaviour so comprehensively
that the individual bond, between the tyrant and the beneficiary, is also broken.
T2 Quidquid erat, quo mihi cohaereret, intercisa iuris humani societas abscidit.
His [the tyrant’s] breaking the fellowship of right and wrong between humans has severed
whatever it was that gave him a bond with me. (7.19.8)9
The tyrant’s offences may have been against other people, such as his own
subjects and their children (19.8–9), not the beneficiary himself. Even so, Seneca
says, the offence against humanity makes null and void the tyrant’s claim to
have his benefit repaid by an individual whom he has not harmed. In one of his
letters Seneca considers the opposite, benign process: correctly observing the
norms and laws governing all interpersonal behaviour (commune ius generis
humani) makes a positive contribution to the more intimate bond of friendship
between individuals (48.3).
In T1, however, ius points to what the slave is capable of doing, either as the
law that confers rights or as the rights themselves.10 The force of humanum is
also different in the two passages. In T1, unlike in T2, it does not restrict the
point to proper treatment of other people, even though Seneca is arguing for a
point about interpersonal benefaction. The meaning is that by being human the
slave has been made capable of acting virtuously. In Stoicism such acts need not
be between people: a slave can exercise his right to act virtuously by meeting
8 See also 7.2.4 (divini iuris atque humani peritus). This expert knows not the gods’ ‘rights’ but
what one should do in relation to the divine; ius humanum should be given a similar inter-
pretation. So too in Cicero De partitione oratoria 129–30 (divinum et humanum ius). Compare
commune ius animantium (Seneca De clementia 1.18), or ius humanum in Oedipus 1026. Inwood
(2005, 230–31) brings together some of the key Senecan passages.
9 intercisa iuris humani societas is translated ‘the breaking of our bond of shared humanity’ in
Griffin and Inwood (2011). Cooper and Procopé (1995) do not include Books 5–7.
10 For ius in a subjective sense in Roman law see Donahue (2001), Donahue (2010, 71–2), and
Tierney (1997, 15–19).
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illness or pain with courage, or by revering the gods with appropriate piety.11 In
T2, by contrast, ius humanum consists exclusively of how to treat, and engage
with, other human beings correctly; those norms, when observed, bind people
together in fellowship, and when they are hideously broken by a tyrant the
bonds between him and others are annulled.
We can now move on from the Latin wording and compare T1 with three
arguments put forward against attributing to Stoics, or other Greek and Roman
philosophers, the concept of human rights.12 One argument is about the unim-
portance, in Stoicism, of such items as bodily health, life, poverty and slavery
(in the familiar social sense, rather than self-enslavement as a moral failing).13
According to this argument, a theory of rights must attribute significant positive
or negative value to these items. Unless we regard health, life (and so on) as
good and contributing to human welfare, and poverty, slavery (etc) as bad, we
will not be motivated sufficiently to promote or preserve the former in other
people, and to rescue and safeguard people from the latter. Stoicism, the
objection then runs, fails to treat life (etc) as a genuine good, and poverty
(etc) as an evil, and so it fails to recognize the importance of items for which
people have rights.14
At most this shows that Stoics do not have our theory of rights.15 But when
judging whether they have a theory of rights it is not certain that we should use
our own axiology as the measure. Arguably what matters is whether people are
11 Courage is mentioned in 3.18.4. For courage and piety as Stoic virtues see, for example,
Plutarch On Stoic self-contradictions 1034d–e, SVF 3.264 and 604. Unlike courage and justice,
courage and piety are not coordinate, as piety is subordinate to justice.
12 The arguments are taken from Burnyeat (2012) and Bett (2012). Burnyeat writes about the
ancient Greeks. Bett (2012) focuses on Stoicism, Roman as well as Greek, and concludes that
Stoics had the notion of human rights only to a limited extent. Cooper and Procopé briefly
compare and contrast T1 with a ‘political doctrine of universal human rights’ (1995, 190, n.27).
13 For moral self-enslavement to desires and fears see De beneficiis 3.28.4, Letter 47.17, Frede
(2011, 67).
14 Bett (2012, 161–68).
15 Bett speaks of a ‘normal understanding’ and a ‘recognizable understanding’ of human rights
(2012, 150, 164). Bett offers a further consideration against attributing a ‘robust’ (2012, 149)
notion of human rights to Stoics: the gulf between the sage and all other people (2012, 158–61).
But strongly divergent moral evaluations of a sage and a non-sage, and the strongly contrasting
descriptions of them that we find in Stoic sources, do not imply that the sage and the non-sage
should be treated differently when in need of material or other forms of assistance. If sages are
entitled to different treatment, it is because of what they can do for others, not their own
wisdom or virtue (Cicero De officiis 3.29–31, 89; compare the discussion of two sages in 3.90,
although there both the community’s interests and the sage’s own interests are said to be
relevant).
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thought to have a right for what is, according to Stoicism itself, good or most
valuable. That measure delivers a very different verdict: Seneca is saying that
the slave has a right for everything that is genuinely good (virtue and what
follows from virtue, especially virtuous action). Moreover, in speaking of ‘our’
theory of rights, or the ‘normal’ theory, there is a risk of overstating the agree-
ment in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries about the range of items for
which people have rights. I have in mind not only debates about whether people
have a right to possess items, or engage in practices, that become possible or
noticed only after and as a result of social or technological change, such as the
right to online privacy. There are also debates about long-standing ways in
which people differ, such as poverty, liberty and social exclusion.16 Two people
may disagree about the list of items for which people have rights, and yet it
would be inappropriate for one of them to use his or her own view about what is
valuable or a contributor to welfare to deny that the other person has a theory of
rights at all. As long as the question is whether Stoicism has a theory of rights, it
is not disqualified if its evaluation of health, poverty, slavery and so on bars it
from treating people as having rights concerning those particular items.
Establishing whether or not Stoic evaluation really does have this implica-
tion would require detailed discussion of their theory of ‘promoted’ and
‘demoted’ indifferents, such as health and poverty. I will not pursue that in
detail, as it is not relevant to T1, which is about the right to benefit, not the right
to freedom, life, health and so on. But if a theory of rights is to be more than a
list of aspirations or desiderata, it does seem intuitive to use the importance of
an item to our welfare as a consideration when deciding whether or not people
have a right to it.17 Stoics may be able to show that their theory gives us good
reason to promote health (etc) in other people, and so that in a Stoic community
parents would take care of sick children, doctors would carry out their job
diligently, and so on. But this does not show that health would be protected
and promoted as something to which people have a right. The same point
applies to other items, such as life and poverty, to which or against which we
might say that people have rights.
The second argument is about the relationship between rights and duties,
such as my right not to be lied to and your duty not to lie to me. Which of them
justifies the other? According to Burnyeat, the concept of rights requires rights to
16 See e. g. Dworkin’s challenge to the view that people have the right to liberty (1978, chap. 12,
‘what rights do we have?’), or Brownlee’s argument for an unacknowledged right against social
deprivation (2013).
17 In Brownlee (2013) importance is used as one of several ‘tests’ for human rights. See also
Tasioulas (2007, 77 and 92).
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be prior to duties in the sense that the duty is justified with reference to the
right, not vice versa: it is because I have a right not to be lied to that you should
not lie to me.18 If the justification goes in the other direction (my right derives
from your duty), the right is not fundamental. ‘I should not want to speak of a
concept of human rights until the beneficiaries come first in the order of
justification.’19
For the sake of argument let us concede to Burnyeat that this order of
justification really is, as he holds, a necessary condition for a theory or concept
of rights. In T1 itself there is no relation of justification between a duty and a
right. (We will see later, however, that the broader context of T1 does imply a
claim about duties.) The slave possesses the right to be a benefactor, not a
beneficiary, and the slave possesses this right independently of the duties of
others. It derives simply from his being human. If Burnyeat’s point is only the
negative one that a right must not be justified with reference to duties, it has no
force against attributing to Seneca a concept of rights in T1 – for there are no
duties in the passage from which the right follows. But if Burnyeat is also
stipulating that a right must have as a direct corollary duties on the part of
others, his point would indeed bar the attribution. Seneca does not argue that
the slave’s right to benefit his master calls, in itself, for other people, such as the
master himself, to treat the slave in certain ways – or not to treat him in certain
ways. The obligation is theoretical or conceptual, not practical: we must think of
the slave as capable of benefiting others. Seneca and his fellow Stoics, such as
Hecaton, must recognize this right in their moral theory, not in action.20
This starts to show how T1 differs from common expectations for theories of
human rights, and it brings me to the third and most powerful argument.
People’s right to something must have as its counterpart a duty in others to
provide it to them, or not to prevent them from having it:
The idea of a right to these things is meaningless, because they cannot be conferred on a
person, or taken away from a person, by others; if one is wise, one has them, and if one is
not, one does not, and that is the end of the story.21
18 Burnyeat (2012, 285–87). Burnyeat cites the account in Dworkin (1978, 171), which is the
source of the example. Dworkin for his part was arguing merely that treating rights, not duties,
as fundamental makes a difference to the character of a theory; he was not arguing that making
rights fundamental is a necessary condition for having the concept of rights at all (1978, 171–77).
Tasioulas (2007, 99) helpfully distinguishes between ways in which rights or duties can be
prior.
19 Burnyeat (2012, 286).
20 For Hecaton see n.4 above.
21 Bett (2012, 164). See also Bett (2012, 162–63), where he suggests that if other people cannot
secure for you the items for which you have a right, the ‘notion of rights has no application’.
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To put the point more generally: someone does not have a genuine right
unless other people have correlative duties, and the existence of a right implies
the existence of duties for others. Within the modern literature this is a vener-
able position: according to Hohfeld’s (still foundational) study, if person X has a
right ‘in the strictest sense’ or the ‘proper meaning’, that right has, as its
correlative, Y’s duty to act or refrain from acting.22 Hohfeld distinguishes these
(genuine) rights from other legal relations that are often called ‘rights’. But it has
been argued that a wider range of relations counts as rights – even by studies
that otherwise follow Hohfeld closely. For example, arguably there are cases
where X has a right to perform an action by virtue of not having a duty to refrain
from it: people without a driving licence have a duty not to drive cars, but
someone who gains a driving licence is exempted from that duty and now holds
the (legal) right to drive a car.23 It is now the right-holder’s own duties that are
relevant, not those of other people.
In philosophical discussions of rights it is not agreed, then, that a right can
be attributed to a person only if other people have a duty to act or refrain from
acting. But in order to avoid resting my argument on one position in the modern
literature, I will stack the cards against the attribution of ‘human rights’ theory
to Stoics by assuming that the possession of a right implies that other people
have duties. To develop this assumption further: let us suppose that the point of
the discourse of ‘rights’ is to identify areas where people are vulnerable, and
others (individuals, institutions or governments) mighty, or at least able to harm
or benefit. Attributing rights to people, on this view, responds to human vulner-
ability and stipulates what should be done for them and should not be done to
them. Often it is motivated by what has or has not been done in the past:
negligent, exploitative, cruel or even worse treatment that has caused people
Compare the following: ‘rights are seen as one side of a normative relationship between right-
holders and obligation-bearers. We normally regard supposed claims or entitlements that
nobody is obliged to respect or honour as null and void, indeed undefined’ (O’Neill 2005, 430).
22 Hohfeld (1919, 36 and 38).
23 See Wenar (2005), especially 226 (the source of the example). Hohfeld argued that these
relations should be called ‘privileges’ and thereby sought to distinguish them from rights in the
proper sense. By contrast, Wenar presents privileges as one kind of right, and claims (where
other people have duties), which alone count as rights for Hohfeld, as another kind (‘claim-
rights’). ‘Some rights are privileges, and some rights are claims’ (Wenar 2005, 229). On the other
hand, Wenar requires a right to perform one or more of six ‘functions’, such as protection or
authorization (2005, 246). See also Wenar’s entry on rights in the online Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/. Here too Wenar argues that not all
rights are ‘claims’ and imply that other people have duties.
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harm.24 Seneca approaches the topic of rights in a completely different spirit. He
wishes to show that, in respect of their ability to act virtuously, slaves are
invulnerable; people necessarily have the ability to act virtuously, no matter
what becomes of their social status.25 Slaves cannot be harmed by others by
being stripped of this ability. And slaves cannot be benefited by others either, in
respect of the slaves’ own virtuous action: nobody can carry out a slave’s
virtuous action, or do it for the slave, except the slave himself.
This is not merely to say that the slave’s right is inalienable, if by that we
mean that the right itself cannot be forfeited by bad conduct or by renouncing it.
Someone could have an inalienable right to free speech, for example, and yet be
denied free speech by the actions of others: the right remains, but the person is
compelled to keep silent. Seneca means not only that the right itself is inalien-
able, but that the slave cannot be prevented by other people, his social circum-
stances, and so on from having that for which he has the right, namely virtue and
virtuous action.
But before we conclude that the rights in T1 have no connection at all with
the duties of other people, we need to consider the broader social theory to
which the passage is contributing. De beneficiis attaches enormous importance
to receiving benefits correctly and, in particular, to gratitude (2.22–35, 3.1–5,
4.40, 6.25–43, 7.14–16.4). As soon as someone accepts a benefit he or she should
think about how to repay it (2.25.3). Seneca’s assertion in T1 that slaves can
confer benefits brings the slave-master relationship into this framework. It has,
in this context, the practical implication that a master can have the obligation to
his slave of repaying a benefit.26
T3 An aecum videtur tibi, quibus, si minus debito faciant, irascimur, non haberi gratiam, si
plus debito solitoque fecerint?
We get angry with slaves if they do less than they should – do you think it right not to be
grateful to them if they have done more than their usual duties? (3.22.2)
Characteristically Seneca provides examples to support his argument that slaves
can provide benefits, and two of those examples end with the slaves manumitted
24 ‘Disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged
the conscience ofmankind’ (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, https://www.un.org/en/
universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html).
25 Elsewhere he says that we are born ‘with equal rights’ (aequo iure), but one person has been
given (presumably as a slave) to another (Consolation to Marcia 20.2). The contrast suggests that
people no longer possess, or no longer can exercise, these rights; and so the rights must be
different from those of T1.
26 Griffin and Inwood show this succinctly in their introduction (2011, 7).
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by grateful masters (3.23.3, 3.27.4). Of course, a slave may fail to take an oppor-
tunity to benefit his master, and a master may decline a slave’s benefit (3.22.4),
either by simply refusing it or by pre-emptively manumitting the slave and so
receiving the benefit without its coming from a slave.27 But manumission may be
impractical and refusing the slave’s benefit may have a prohibitively high cost,
such as when slaves rescue their masters from imminent death (3.23.2–4).
The connection between the slave’s right and the master’s duty to repay is
not direct but conditional on both the slave’s exercising in his actions the right
to benefit and the master’s choosing to receive the benefit, at least in cases
where refusal is a real option for the master. So the difference between T1 and
the expectations for human rights outlined above is not that the slave’s right has
no bearing at all on the duties of others. It is rather that (a) the connection
between right and duty is indirect and conditional, and (b) the duty is not to
provide the item(s) for which the slave has a right, namely virtuous action. That
is, (a) the slave’s right to benefit creates a duty for his master – but only if
exercised, and if the master does not refuse the benefit. And (b) the slave’s
‘rights’ are to act virtuously and benefit others, and nobody can bestow virtuous
action upon the slave: it is up to the slave to attain virtue himself.
Showing how Seneca conceives of human rights in T1 thus demands atten-
tion to the account of human interaction, and interpersonal obligations,
defended elsewhere in De beneficiis. We are not in a position to say to what
extent his concept of a human right resembles ours until we look to this social
theory. In this regard we can take as our model Frede’s account (2011) of free will
in Stoic and other ancient philosophy, which keeps in sight the moral and
theological assumptions underpinning Stoic accounts of free will. In fact,
Frede’s book contains a powerful description of how the world’s providential
design confers upon slaves their right to be virtuous:
There is in addition the assumption that this world down to the smallest detail is governed
by a good and provident God, and that this God, in creating the world, has made sure that
neither human nature nor our individual nature and constitution nor the circumstances
into which we are born, nor the conjunction of these three factors, would prevent us from
developing in such a way as to be able to make the right choices and decisions in our life.28
Nobody and nothing except the slave himself can deny him the virtuous actions
for which he has a god-given right. Stoics would find extraordinary the idea that
27 The option of refusing a benefit is mentioned elsewhere and does not concern only masters
and slaves. See Seneca’s discussion of the people from whom we should accept benefits (2.18.2–
21.6).
28 Frede (2011, 85).
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God or the gods could give the slave a right to something, and someone else
then prevent the slave from having that very item.
This assumes that conferring a benefit requires nothing more than virtue
and virtuous action. But there is a difficulty for Seneca, and it arises from the
fact that other people can deny slaves the gratitude and repayment that their
virtuous actions deserve. Some masters would be dismayed, not pleased, to find
themselves with an obligation to a slave. Seneca does what he can to ‘crush the
arrogance’ (3.29.1) of such masters and to provide examples where a slave’s
action is gratefully rewarded, such as the following: ‘she freed them both
immediately and did not resent the fact that she owed her life to those over
whom she previously had the power of life and death’ (3.23.3). All the same, it is
undeniable that some think themselves, in Seneca’s words, too good to receive
benefits from slaves (3.28.4). And near the start of the work Seneca defines a
benefit as an action that causes its recipient to feel joy.
T4 Quid est ergo beneficium? Benevola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id,
quod facit, prona et sponte sua parata.
What then is a benefit? A well-intentioned action conferring joy and, by conferring joy,
receiving it, disposed and of its own accord ready to do what it does. (1.6.1)
It is hard to see how a slave’s right to give a benefit, as defended in T1, can be
squared with the definition in T4.29 T4 and other passages suggest that the mind
of the recipient matters as well as that of the benefactor: a benefit is a trans-
action between two minds (2.34.1), and in conferring a benefit one seeks to give
the recipient pleasure and cause him to feel gratitude (2.31.2–3, 2.33.1).30 A
master’s grudging attitude, or conception of himself as the slave’s superior,
can prevent a slave from causing the master ‘joy’, even through virtuous actions.
So it is no accident that in T1, where Seneca argues that slaves can confer
benefits, he turns to the slave’s own virtue, not his causing joy in others, and
then presents giving benefits as part of virtue (3.18.4). It is certainly within the
slave’s power to act virtuously by perfecting his reason and acting appropriately,
29 The same difficulty arises about the gods’ benefits to all human beings, even the ungrateful
and impious (1.1.9, 2.29.1–6, 4.4.3, 6.23.6–8, 7.31.2–4). There too it seems possible to provide a
benefit without causing joy in the recipient, despite the definition in T4.
30 When arguing against the possibility of benefiting oneself Seneca assumes that, in inter-
personal benefits, ingratitude causes the benefit to ‘perish’ (5.8.6). The fact that it does not
perish when people supposedly benefit themselves without feeling gratitude is used to throw
into doubt the whole idea of benefiting oneself. Contrast 5.20.2, where Seneca dismisses the
emotion of the recipient: what matters is whether he ought to feel joy, not whether he actually
feels it.
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which will involve careful choice of when, and to whom, he confers benefits. But
no slave, however virtuous, can ensure on his own that his actions prompt the
appropriate affective response in his master. Whether or not the slave has the
ability attributed to him in T1 depends on whether providing a benefit success-
fully requires merely the right action and intention on the part of the benefactor
or, in addition, joy in the beneficiary, as in the definition provided by T4. On
that further question Seneca’s text is ultimately undecided.31
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